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1.1  Introduction 
The Project on Developing Country Debt undertaken by the National 
Bureau of  Economic Research in the past two years seeks to provide 
a detailed analysis of the ongoing developing country debt crisis. The 
focus is on the middle-income developing countries, particularly those 
in  Latin America and East Asia,  though many lessons of  the study 
should apply as well to the poorer debtor countries  in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
The urgency of the NBER study should be self-evident. For dozens 
of  developing countries, the financial upheavals of the 1980s have set 
back economic development by  a decade or more. Poverty has inten- 
sified in much of the developing world as countries have struggled under 
an enormous external debt burden. Moreover, the world financial sys- 
tem has been disrupted by  the prospect of widespread defaults on the 
foreign debts of  the developing world. More than six years after the 
onset of the crisis, almost all of the debtor countries are still unable to 
borrow in the international capital markets on normal market terms. 
Table 1.1 shows several aspects of the ecomomic crisis of the major 
debtor countries in recent years. Since the dramatic outbreak of  the 
crisis in  1982, economic growth has slowed sharply or has been neg- 
ative. Per capita incomes in the most indebted countries are still gen- 
erally well below the levels of  1980. And ominously, debt-export ratios 
are higher today than at the beginning of the crisis. 
Future growth prospects are clouded by  a sharp drop in  the share 
of  capital formation in GDP. At the same time, inflation has risen to 
remarkable levels throughout Latin America. The mechanisms behind 
the epidemic of  high inflations are basically the same that caused the 
1 Table 1.1  The Economic Crisis in the Heavily Indebted Countries 
Average 
1969-78  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  I984  1985  1986 




(percent of GDP) 
Inflation (annual  28.5  40.8  47.4  53.2  57.7  90.8  116.4  126.9  76.2 
Gross capital  n.a.  24.9  24.7  24.5  22.3  18.2  17.4  16.5  16.8 
Debt-export ratio  n.a.  182.3  167.1  201.4  269.8  289.7  272.1  284.2  337.9 
Source: All data refer to the fifteen  heavily  indebted countries: Argentina,  Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, 
Ivory Coast, Ecuador, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia. Data are 
from the IMF World Economic Outlook. April  1987. Inflation refers to the consumer price index. 
n.a.  = not available. 3  Introduction 
hyperinflations in Central Europe after World War I, with foreign debts 
now  playing the role  that  reparations  payments played  in  the post- 
World War I crisis. 
The NBER Project analyzes the crisis from two perspectives, that 
of the individual debtor country, and the international financial system 
as a whole. This volume contains the studies of the international fi- 
nancial system as a whole. The country studies are contained in two 
companion volumes, Developing Country Debt and Economic Perfor- 
mance: Country Studies (volumes 2 and 3). A major goal of the country 
studies is  to understand  why  some countries, such as Argentina or 
Mexico, succumbed to a serious crisis, while others, such as Indonesia 
or Korea, did not. Another important goal is to understand why most 
of the debtor countries have been unable to overcome the crisis despite 
many years of harsh economic adjustments. To analyze such questions, 
the NBER commissioned eight detailed country monographs, covering 
four countries in Latin America and four countries in the Middle East 
and East Asia. Each study was prepared by a team of two authors, a 
U.S.-based researcher and an economist from the country under study: 
Argentina, by Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo; Bolivia, 
by Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs; Brazil, by Eliana A. 
Cardoso and Albert Fishlow; Mexico, by  Edward F.  Buffie, with the 
assistance of  Allen Sangines Krause; Indonesia, by Wing Thye Woo 
and Anwar Nasution; the Philippines, by Robert S. Dohner and Pon- 
ciano Intal, Jr.; South Korea, by Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park; 
and Turkey, by Merih CelAsun and Dani Rodrik. 
The individual country studies can answer only some of the questions 
about the crisis, since global factors have undoubtedly  been  key to 
many of  the developments in  the past few years. Indeed, as Lindert 
and Morton stress in their contribution to this volume, international 
debt crises have been  a recurrent  part of  the international  financial 
landscape for at least 175 years, in the 1820s, 1870s, 1890s, 1930s, and 
1980s. It is important to understand the fundamental properties of the 
international macroeconomy and global financial markets which have 
contributed to this repeated instability. 
The NBER studies in this volume cover a wide range of topics. Peter 
Lindert and Peter Morton study the history of  sovereign debt from 
1850 until the present, offering us a sweeping historical panorama and 
several important new findings. Perhaps most important is their con- 
clusion that some form of debt relief (i.e., a renegotiation of the foreign 
debt that reduces the present value of the repayment stream below the 
original contractual level) has been a central feature of most “work- 
outs’’ of  past  debt crises. Barry  Eichengreen  reviews  in  detail  the 
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20th century, and arrives at several conclusions in accord with Lindert 
and Morton. 
Three papers in this volume take up the issues of adjustment prob- 
lems in the debtor countries. As the country case studies amply doc- 
ument, adjustment to the debt crisis in the  1980s has been anything 
but smooth! Six years after the onset of  the crisis, inflation in  Latin 
America was averaging more than  150 percent per year, and no major 
debtor country had restored normal access to borrowing on the inter- 
national  capital markets. The papers by  Sebastian Edwards, Jeffrey 
Sachs, and Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, all complement the 
country studies in shedding some light on the adjustment problems of 
the debtor countries. 
Edwards emphasizes the profound difficulties of combining macro- 
economic policies  (e.g., reductions in  the public-sector  deficit) with 
structural policies (e.g., tariff reductions). Sachs emphasizes the lim- 
itations in IMF and World Bank conditionality, and argues that debt 
relief should play an important role in many of the programs supervised 
by the international  institutions.  Haggard and Kaufman focus on the 
political requirements for successful stabilization, and suggest that the 
political design of  adjustment programs is as important as their eco- 
nomic design. 
The final three papers in this volume focus on various global aspects 
of  the problem. Paul  Krugman  examines the relationship  of  debtor 
governments and their private bank creditors. Rudiger Dornbusch dis- 
cusses the linkages of industrial country macroeconomic policies and 
debtor country economic performance. Stanley Fischer,  in the final 
paper of the volume, examines various proposals for global solutions 
to the debt crisis. 
1.1.1  The Creditor and Debtor Interpretations of the Debt Crisis 
The international debt crisis has already given rise to many oversim- 
plified interpretations, most of which can be dismissed on the basis of 
the studies in the NBER project.  Simple ideas abound on this topic, 
often because they serve particular vested interests. Creditors want to 
blame  the crisis  on the policy  mistakes  of  the debtor governments. 
Debtors want  to blame  the crisis  on the macroeconomic and  trade 
policies of the creditor governments. Both  sides are keen to neglect 
the more nuanced historical record. 
The mainstream  creditor interpretation (as expressed variously by 
the United  States government. the international  institutions,  and the 
commercial  banks) can be  summarized  as follows.  The debt crisis 
emerged largely because of the policy mistakes of  the debtor govern- 
ments. Loans were wasted  by  inefficient  state enterprises, or were 
squandered in capital flight. “Successful” governments were those like 5  Introduction 
South Korea, which pursued free-market economic policies, while un- 
successful governments smothered economic growth with government 
regulations.  With  sufficient economic reforms, including  trade liber- 
alization and an encouragement of foreign direct investment, the debtor 
countries will be able to grow out of the current crisis. 
Most  creditors have  also maintained  that the only proper way  to 
manage the current crisis is to insist that the debtor governments honor 
their debts in full, since to do otherwise would threaten the international 
financial system. To grant debt relief to the debtors, they also suggest, 
would hurt the debtors more than it would help them, because it would 
cut the  debtors off  from  future borrowing  from  the world  financial 
markets, and thereby hinder their economic growth. 
The debtor perspective of course differs at key points. Debtor gov- 
ernments hold  that the crisis  erupted because of  the rise  in  world 
interest rates, the fall in commodity prices, and the collapse of world 
trade at the beginning of the 1980s. They blame the macroeconomic 
policies of the creditor governments, particularly the U.S.  fiscal poli- 
cies, for many  of  the global  shocks. Debtor governments typically 
downplay the role of  debtor country policies  in the crisis, and often 
state that advocates of  “free market policies”  are responding to the 
crisis by serving foreign interests (e.g., multinational firms) at the ex- 
pense of domestic interests. 
Many debtor governments argue that successful adjustment will re- 
quire some debt relief. One reason for this pessimism is the view that 
attempts to honor the debt burden  through  increased exports would 
merely promote offsetting protectionist pressures in the creditor econ- 
omies. Another reason is the view that the austerity required to service 
the debts on the original terms would generate political and economic 
instabilities that would be self-defeating, and ultimately detrimental to 
the creditors as well as to the debtors. 
The evidence from the NBER study belies many of the points com- 
monly made by both the creditors and the debtors. The NBER study 
offers fresh evidence on several important issues: the sources of the 
debt crisis (and of debt crises in the past); the patterns of economic 
adjustment in a debtor country after a debt crisis gets underway; the 
nature of bargaining  between debtors and creditors; and the role for 
public policy in easing or eliminating the global crisis. These subjects 
are taken up in detail in the following sections. 
1.2. 
The debt crisis arose from a combination  of policy  actions in  the 
debtor countries, macroeconomic shocks in the world economy, and 
a remarkable spurt of unrestrained bank lending during 1979-81.  The 
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“unsuccessful”  adjusters (all but Indonesia and South Korea among 
the countries in  the NBER study) fell prey  to a common pattern of 
policy actions: chrdnically large budget deficits; overvalued exchange 
rates; and a trade regime biased against exports in general, and agri- 
culture in  particular.  These policies  would  have  hindered  economic 
performance in most circumstances, but they provoked  a deep crisis 
when combined with severe shocks to world interest rates, exchange 
rates, and commodity prices, in the early 1980s. The crisis was greatly 
exacerbated because for many years the commercial banks provided 
financial support for the bad policies of  the developing countries, par- 
ticularly during 1979-81,  and then abruptly withdraw new credits start- 
ing in  1982. 
1.2.1 
The importance of global macroeconomic changes in provoking the 
current debt crisis has been widely noted (see Sachs 1987 for a review 
of this issue). The growth of the Eurodollar market and the OPEC price 
shocks of  1973-74  put in motion a period of rapid bank lending to the 
developing countries. During the period 1973-79,  the export proceeds 
of the developing countries boomed, while nominal interest  rates on 
the loans were low, contributing to the happy state of affairs that debt- 
to-export ratios remained modest despite heavy borrowing by the de- 
veloping countries. Indeed, for the non-oil LDCs as a whole, the debt- 
export ratio  was  lower in  1980 than  in  1973, while for the western 
hemisphere LDCs it was only marginally higher in  1980 compared to 
1973, as can be seen in the data in table  1.2. 
At the end of the 1970s, therefore, the pace of  international lending 
did not seem to pose a serious danger to the commercial banks or to 
the world  economy.  But few observers fully  appreciated how  much 
this happy state of affairs depended on nominal interest rates remaining 
below the growth rate of dollar exports of the borrowing countries (put 
another way, real interest rates remaining below the growth rate of real 
The Role of Global Shocks 
Table 1.2  Debt-Export Ratios, 1973 to 1986, as a Percentage, Selected Years 
(percent)  1973  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986” 
~~  ~ 
Non-oil LDCs  115.4  112.9  124.9  143.3  152.8  148.3  162.0  162.2 
Western  176.2  178.4  207.9  273.1  290.4  275.2  296.2  331.3 
Hemisphere 
LDCs 
Source:  International Monetary Fund, World Economic  Outlook,  April 1986 and October 
1986 editions. 
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exports).  Even  worse,  almost nobody  foresaw  that  the  era of  high 
export growth and low interest rates would come abruptly to an end 
at the end of the 1970s: 
In the happy case that interest rates are below export growth rates, 
borrowers  can borrow  all  the  money  needed  to service their  loans 
without suffering a rise in  the debt-to-export ratio (since exports will 
grow faster than the debt). In other words, the borrower does not have 
to contribute any of its own resources to servicing its debts. Once the 
interest  rate  rises above the  export growth  rate, however,  then  the 
country cannot simply borrow the money to service its debts without 
incurring  a  sharply  rising debt-to-export ratio.  Sooner or later, the 
country will be cut off from new borrowing, and it will have to pay for 
its debt servicing out of  its own national resources, i.e., by  running 
trade surpluses vis-a-vis the rest of the world. 
The remarkable fact is how abruptly the interest rate-growth  rate 
relationship was reversed as of 1980, as shown in figure 1.1. Extremely 
tight monetary policies in  the industrial  countries, designed to fight 
inflation, provoked a sharp rise in interest rates, an industrial country 
recession, and a steep fall in  the export prices and terms of  trade of 
the developing countries. The debt crisis followed relentlessly  upon 
the resulting rise in interest rates and the collapse in developing country 
export earnings. All of a sudden, all of the debt warning signs started 
to fly off the charts, as seen by the rapid increase in  the debt-export 
and debt-service ratios after 1980. Commercial bank lending dried up 
once the debt-export ratios started to soar. Total gross bank lending 
to the non-oil developing countries rose by  24 percent in  1980 over 
1979, 18 percent in  1981, and only 7 percent in 1982. 
-101  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
Fig. 1.1  Interest rates and annual change in non-oil export earnings 8  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
1.2.2  The Role of Bank Lending Behavior 
Few observers perceived the risks of international lending as of the 
end of the 1970s, least of all the lenders themselves. Lindert and Mor- 
ton, as well  as Eichengreen, suggest that in earlier historical  experi- 
ences as well, lenders lost sight of the inherent risks of cross-border 
lending.  In the late  1970s, bankers adopted the credo of  the world’s 
leading international banker, Citicorp Chairman Walter Wriston, who 
justified the heavy international lending with the declaration that “coun- 
tries never go bankrupt.”  In the mid- and late 1970s, the commercial 
banks were making enormous profits on their cross-border lending to 
the developing countries. In Citicorp’s  case, overall international op- 
erations accounted for 72 percent  of  overall earnings in  1976, with 
Brazil alone accounting for 13 percent of total bank earnings, compared 
with 28 percent for all U.S. operations! (Cited in Makin 1984, 133-34.) 
The banks  had  the recent  loan  experience  to back  them  up.  As 
already pointed  out, the combination of high export growth rates and 
low interest rates meant that debt-to-export ratios remained under con- 
trol despite the heavy lending. There was no real evidence, of course, 
that the countries would be willing or able to pay back their loans, or 
even service them, with their own resources, but that did not seem to 
matter: new lending to repay old loans made sense in the circumstances. 
One can fault the banks severely for not looking more deeply into 
the quality of economic management in the developing countries during 
this period. Few banks, apparently, were concerned with the question 
of whether the debtor countries would be willing and able to service 
their debts if debt servicing had to come out of national resources rather 
than out of new loans. This issue seemed to be an abstract concern, 
at least through the end of the 1970s. 
What is truly remarkable about the bank behavior is not the lending 
during 1973-79,  but rather the outpouring of new lending during 1980- 
81, even after the world macroeconomic situation had soured markedly. 
In table 1.3 we see the astounding fact that in a mere two years, 1980 
and 1981, net bank exposure to the major debtor countries nearly dou- 
bled over the 1979 level. Thus, in the two years after the rise in real 
interest rates, the commercial banks made about as many net loans to 
the major debtors as during the entire period  1973-79. 
This late burst of lending is all the more remarkable, and difficult to 
justify, in light of the enormous capital flight that was occurring at the 
same time, as shown in  table  1.4. In the case of  Argentina, of  the 
tremendous rise during  1980 and 1981 in the overall gross debt of the 
country, 84 percent was offset  by  the outflow of  private capital, ac- 
cording to the estimates of Cumby and Levich (1987). For Venezuela, 
the offset  is well  over  100 percent. I  will  discuss the origins  of  the 
capital flight in more detail below. 9  Introduction 
Table 1.3  Net Liabilities of  Countries to  International Banks in the BIS 
Reporting Area ($ billion) 
December  December 
Country  1979  1981 
Argentina  5.3  16.3 
Brazil  28.8  44.8 
Mexico  22.5  43.4 
Subtotal  56.6  104.5 
Indonesia  -0.1  -1.5 
Malaysia  -  1.3  0.2 
South Korea  7.2  13.7 
Thailand  1.6  1.8 
Subtotal  7.4  15.2 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, “The Maturity Distribution of International 
Bank Lending,” various issues. 
Table 1.4  Capital Flight and Change in External Debt during 1980 and 1981 
for the Major Debtors 
Capital Flight  Change in  Ratio: 
(1980 and 1981)  Gross Debt  (1  10) 
Argentina  12.8  10.8  0.84 
Brazil  19.8  1.9  0.10 
Mexico  35.1  15.6  0.44 
Venezuela  7.8  13.0  1.67 
Source: Cumby and Levich (1987), tables in data appendix. The capital flight variable is 
according to the World Bank definition reported by the authors. 
New market-based lending by  the commercial banks to the devel- 
oping countries virtually  disappeared after 1982. Even where lending 
continued, the transfer of net resources to the country (i.e., new lending 
minus  total  debt servicing on existing  debt) was almost everywhere 
negative: the debtor countries paid more to the commercial banks than 
they received in new funds. Some countries received so-called  “in- 
voluntary loans” as part of financial workout packages, usually linked 
to an IMF program. In such involuntary lending, the banks agreed to 
contribute new funds on a pro rata basis, relative to their exposure at 
an initial  date. Even in this  case, however, the new lending was in- 
variably less than the amount of debt service payments due from the 
country to the bank creditors, so that the net resource transfer to the 
country remained negative. 
The heavy commercial bank lending,  particularly during 1979-81, 
certainly created the potential for a serious international banking crisis. 10  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
As shown in table  1.5, the cross-border exposure of the U.S. money- 
center banks at the end of  1982 to all  of  the developing  countries 
equalled nearly three times total capital, and to Latin America alone 
amounted to almost two times bank capital. This exposure was very 
highly concentrated: about three-fourths of all U .S. commercial bank 
lending to more than 40 LDCs was centered in just four countries- 
Argentina,  Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. The usual prudential  rule 
of limiting exposure to any single borrower to 10 percent of bank capital 
was also ignored. The 10 percent rule was skirted by major U.S. banks 
by counting all different types of public sector borrowers in one country 
(e.g., state enterprises, central government, etc.) as  distinct borrowers, 
even though they were all backed by the same “full faith and credit” 
of the central government and therefore reflected nearly identical credit 
risks. 
1.2.3  The Role of Debtor Country Policies 
In the easy-money period of the  1970s, commercial banks did not 
seriously consider the policies of the debtor countries. As loans were 
not serviced out of the country’s own resources, but rather out of fresh 
borrowing,  the countries were never put to the test of  whether their 
loans were well  used  and their  economic policies  sound. Nor were 
there many complaints about the policies of most of the debtor coun- 
tries, with  the exceptions of  Jamaica, Peru, and  Turkey, which  re- 
scheduled ahead of the rest of the other countries. 
It is only with the emergence of the debt crisis itself that banks began 
to examine the soundness of the earlier borrowing.  Which countries 
Table 1.5  U.S. Bank Assets in the Debtor Countries, Nine Major Banks 
End-I982  Mid-I984  March  1986 
Total Exposure ($ billion) 
All  LDCs  83.4  84.0  75.6 
Latin America  51.2  53.8  52.2 
Africa  5.6  4.9  3.6 
Exposure as Percentage of  Bank Capital 
All LDCs  287.7  246.3  173.2 
Latin America  176.5  157.8  119.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa  19.3  14.3  8.1 
Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, “Country Exposure Lend- 
ing Survey,’’ various statistical releases. End-1982 from statistical release of  15 October 
1984; March  1986 from release of  1 August  1986. Exposures are calculated using data 
for “Total amounts owed to U.S. banks after adjustments for guarantees and external 
borrowing.” Total exposures are calculated for all LDCs (OPEC, Non-oil, Latin America 
(Non-oil Asia, Non-oil Africa); Latin America (Non-oil Latin America plus Ecuador and 
Venezuela); and Africa (Non-oil Africa plus Algeria, Gabon, Libya and Nigeria). 11  Introduction 
could service their debts without a crushing blow to the domestic econ- 
omy? Which countries would  lack the economic or political  stamina 
to maintain  debt servicing? To  some extent, of  course, the answer 
turned on the amount of the borrowing itself relative to national income. 
But  many  other features were of  crucial  significance:  the extent to 
which the debt was held by the public versus the private  sector; the 
distribution of production between tradables and nontradables; the uses 
to which  the earlier borrowing had  been put (consumption, fixed in- 
vestment, financing of private capital flight); and so forth. In all cases, 
these various issues depended integrally on the types of policies that 
the various  borrowing governments had  been following, and  on the 
motivations for the foreign borrowing in the first place. 
The NBER studies suggest that two fundamental dimensions of  pol- 
icy  require emphasis: fiscal  policy  and trade policy.  Moreover,  the 
studies suggest that while certain patterns of policymaking were both 
dysfunctional and deeply rooted, the specific policies pursued during 
1980-82 (after the shift in the world macroeconomic  environment) were 
often pivotal. Did the government adjust to the changed international 
environment effectively, or did it continue to behave as if nothing had 
happened? 
The differences  across countries in  response to the challenges  of 
1980-82  are striking. As Collins and Park made clear in their study of 
South Korea (see the country  studies volumes),  the South Korean 
government adjusted strongly to the global shocks after 1979: budget 
deficits  were cut, the exchange  rate was devalued, and a policy  of 
heavy investment in highly capital intensive industries  was scaled back. 
Nineteen eighty  was  a year of economic and  political  crisis, but  by 
1981 the economy was already readjusting to the new global environ- 
ment. Indonesia and Turkey similarly adjusted early on. Indonesia had 
devalued substantially in 1978, which helped it greatly in the subsequent 
adjustment. Turkey in fact had fallen into economic crisis already by 
1977-78,  and political crisis soon thereafter.  Strong adjustment mea- 
sures, backed  by  the international  official community,  were already 
being set by early 1980. When a military coup intervened, the military 
government continued the adjustment policies that the preceeding ci- 
vilian government had set in motion, and even retained as deputy prime 
minister Mr. Turgut Ozal, who had originated the reform effort in the 
previous civilian government. 
The contrast with the other five countries in the NBER study could 
not be more stark. In Brazil, for example, when the planning minister, 
Mr.  Mario Simonsen, began  to apply  budget-tightening measures in 
1979, the policies were vigorously attacked as “recessionist,” and Si- 
monsen was soon replaced  by another minister,  Mr. Antonio Delfim 
Netto, whose response to the external shocks was an acceleration of l2  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
foreign borrowing. Rather than restraining spending at the crucial mo- 
ment, Brazil stepped on the accelerator, a choice that still haunts the 
economy  today.  In  neighboring  Bolivia,  political  chaos  effectively 
blocked any coherent response to the global economic shifts. Bolivia 
had no less than eleven heads of state between 1978 and  1982, as the 
economy drifted towards hyperinflation. 
In Argentina,  policies  went similarly awry. At almost the moment 
that world real interest rates began to soar, Argentina embarked on a 
disasterous policy of pegging the Argentine peso to the dollar, with the 
result of discouraging exports and encouraging capital flight and im- 
ports, and thereby contributing to an enormous bulge  in foreign bor- 
rowing. In Mexico, the critical period from 1979 to 1982 was approached 
not with restraint and a sense of caution, but with the greatest increase 
in government spending in Mexico’s entire history. Despite the warning 
signs in the world economy, the Portillo government increased  gov- 
ernment expenditure as a share of GNP from 32 percent in  1979 to an 
astounding 47  percent in  1982, and raised  the public sector deficit to 
17.6 percent of GNP in  1982. 
Finally, in the Philippines, the political business cycle crashed against 
the international business cycle. The most significant excesses in Mar- 
cos’s now legendary cronyism were being  set in  place as the world 
economic environment seriously deteriorated. 
1.2.4  The Role of  Fiscal Policy 
Many of the policy actions in the debtor countries are not “mistakes” 
or technical misjudgments, but were the result of deeper political inst- 
abilities. The economies in  Latin America, in  particular,  are deeply 
riven by great inequalities of income, which in turn prompt fierce po- 
litical conflicts. The chronically large budget deficits in these countries 
are a reflection of these political conflicts. In some of the cases under 
study, the governments were too weak to resist the demands for spend- 
ing from various highly mobilized social groups. In the most patholog- 
ical cases, the political battle degenerated into a battle of ‘‘ins’’ versus 
“outs,” with the ins using the apparatus of the government for narrow 
personal gain. The worst excesses of this sort are seen in the Philippines 
under Marcos, and in several Bolivian regimes in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. 
At the same time, the governments either could not, or chose not 
to, raise taxes on the economic elites. On both the spending and revenue 
sides, therefore, political institutions repeatedly failed to keep the de- 
mands for government spending in line with the government’s limited 
tax collections. Foreign borrowing in the 1970s and early 1980s provided 
a short-term way out of these political dilemmas, by allowing govern- 
ments to finance large budget deficits without incurring high inflationary 
costs in  the short term. Simply put, the governments could  borrow 13  Introduction 
from abroad, rather than face the monetary consequences of borrowing 
directly from the central bank. Once the net capital inflows ceased in 
the early  1980s, and governments had to start making net payments 
abroad, the inflationary consequences emerged, as governments were 
not able to reduce expenditures and raise revenues sufficiently in re- 
sponse to the shift from net inflows of foreign capital to net outflows. 
They instead  turned to printing  money  to make  up the shortfall  in 
foreign lending. 
One of the most talked about, and misunderstood, phenomena in the 
debt crisis is that of “capital  flight.”  Capital flight refers to the accu- 
mulation of foreign assets by the private sector of an economy, often 
at the same time that the public sector is incurring sharply rising ex- 
ternal  debts. As an example, while  the Mexican government accu- 
mulated  debts of approximately $75  billion  to foreign creditors, the 
Mexican private sector accumulated claims abroad in the amount of 
perhaps $40 billion. This phenomenon of heavy public debts and large 
private assets is mainly a reflection of the loose fiscal policies that we 
have been emphasizing. 
The predominant mechanics of capital flight in  the late 1970s and 
early  1980s were as follows: Suppose that the government increases 
transfer payments to the private economy.  In order to finance these 
transfer payments, it borrows from the central bank. The central bank 
financing causes an incipient rise in the money supply as the govern- 
ment spends the borrowed funds. The higher money balances lead to 
a weakening of the exchange rate as the private sector, flush with cash, 
attempts to convert some of the increased  transfers into foreign cur- 
rency. This creates the tendency towards higher inflation (the weak- 
ening of the currency would tend to raise the domestic prices of imports, 
exports, and import-competing goods). In order to stabilize the price 
level, the central bank keeps the exchange rate from depreciating by 
selling foreign exchange in return for the domestic currency (the excess 
money balances are thereby drained from the economy). The central 
bank runs down its reserves, and the private sector increases its foreign 
asset holdings. 
To  maintain an adequate level of resources, the central bank itself 
might then turn to world capital markets for a foreign loan to replenish 
its reserves. Over time, the result would be the growing foreign debt 
of the central bank, and growing private sector claims held in the form 
of foreign currency (and perhaps actually held abroad). The phenom- 
enon is  labelled  “capital  flight,”  but is  simply  the consequence of 
(1) large fiscal deficits, and (2) an anti-inflationary policy of pegging the 
nominal exchange rate. 
As noted below, the fiscal consequences of the foreign borrowing in 
the  1970s were exacerbated by  a common pattern of  policy  actions 
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1982, many private firms that had borrowed heavily from abroad were 
put into financial distress. In country after country, governments took 
over the private debt on favorable terms for the private sector firms, 
or subsidized the private debt service payments, in order to bail out 
the private firms. This “socialization”  of the private debt resulted in 
a significant increase in the3fiscaf burden of the nation’s foreign debt. 
1.2.5  The Trade Regime 
To the extent that foreign borrowing finances efficient investment in 
an economy above the level that would  otherwise be financed  with 
domestic savings, the foreign borrowing  could  well  be prudent and 
welfare enhancing.  The key condition is that the investment project 
yield a return that is above the world cost of capital, when the project’s 
costs and returns are measured at appropriate shadow prices (i.e., at 
prices that take into account the distortions in incentives in the bor- 
rowing economy). Of course, much of the heavy foreign borrowing did 
not finance investment at all. It was used, instead, to finance current 
consumption spending as well as capital flight by the private sector. 
It is well known from trade theory that strongly protectionist policies 
drive an important wedge between market prices and shadow prices, 
and thereby tend to lead to important distortions in the allocation of 
investment spending. In particular, investment is allocated too heavily 
towards nontradables and import-competing  goods, and too little to- 
wards exportables. The result is that investments that may be profitable 
at market prices  may  be unprofitable  at appropriate shadow values. 
Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977), among others, demonstrated that 
foreign borrowing to support such misallocated investment is almost 
surely welfare worsening. 
There is considerable evidence from the studies of Bhagwati (1978), 
Krueger (1978), Balassa  (1984), Sachs (1985), and others, that econ- 
omies with heavily protectionist trade regimes fare less well in overall 
economic performance than economies with more balanced trade re- 
gimes. The superior performance of so-called “outward-oriented” re- 
gimes appears to involve not only  a better allocation  of investment 
spending along the lines just suggested, but also other factors that are 
more difficult to quantify (such as improved technology transfer from 
abroad, higher savings rates, more market competition, and a tendency 
towards better exchange rate management). 
The country studies in the NBER project support earlier findings on 
the superiority of outward-oriented regimes. By far the most successful 
performer in  the NBER study is South Korea, the quintessential out- 
ward-oriented economy. Outward-orientation  is generally measured by 
the overall  incentives  of  the trade regime on  the production of  ex- 
portables relative to import-competing goods. The evidence described 15  Introduction 
by Collins and Park suggests that the overall effect of trade incentives 
in Korea is to favor exportables, as opposed to the trade regimes in 
Latin America which have typically been anti-export (and favorable to 
import-competing sectors). As shown by  Woo  and Nasution, the In- 
donesian trade regime under Soeharto seems to lie between the outward 
orientation of  the South Korean case, and the inward orientation of 
the Latin American cases. In Turkey, the trade regime became much 
more outward oriented during the 1980s. 
In addition  to tariffs and quotas, the management  of  the nominal 
exchange rate can have an important bearing on the relative profitability 
of  exports  versus  import-competing goods, When  the  nominal  ex- 
change rate is overvalued, to the extent that the central bank rations 
the sale of foreign exchange for current transactions, the result is typ- 
ically an implicit tax on exports, even if no tariffs or trade quotas are 
imposed. A black market for foreign exchange results from the ration- 
ing, allowing a rise in the domestic price of  import-competing goods 
(which at the margin are imported at the black market rate). Exporters, 
on the other hand, typically must surrender exchange at the overvalued 
official rate. The typical result of the foreign exchange rationing, there- 
fore, is to lower the relative price of  exports, and to bias production 
away from the export sector. 
As shown in Sachs (1985), and confirmed again by the country stud- 
ies, the East Asian economies (South Korea and Indonesia in the NBER 
sample) never allowed a substantial black market premium to develop 
during the  1970s and  1980s, while the Latin American economies all 
had phases of  substantial black market premia on their currencies. 
Another dimension of  policy is the balance  of  incentives between 
tradables as a whole relative to nontradables (e.g., construction and 
services). Even when foreign exchange is not rationed, so that a black 
market  premium  does not  arise, the failure  to devalue the  nominal 
exchange rate  in line with domestic inflation can result  in the fall in 
tradables prices  relative to nontradables prices,  with  the result  that 
production of  both exportables and import-competing goods (at least 
those import-competing goods not protected by  quotas), are hurt rel- 
ative to the production of nontradables. The Korean authorities clearly 
managed the nominal exchange rate throughout  the  1970s and  1980s 
with  a close  eye on  maintaining a rough  constancy  in  the  price  of 
tradables relative to nontradables. Indonesia, as well, stands out as a 
rare case in which devaluations of  the exchange rate (in  1978, 1983, 
and 1986) were undertaken explicitly in order to keep tradables goods 
in line with rising nontradables goods prices, even before a balance of 
payments crisis occurred. 
Turkey provides a particularly interesting example regarding the trade 
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was afflicted by a chronically overvalued exchange rate (with a large black 
market premium), import rationing, and an overall anti-export bias. After 
the onset of the debt crisis at  the end of the 1970s, the government moved 
to a strategy of export-led growth. This policy was based initially on a 
significant depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, which succeeded 
in raising the relative price of tradables, and of nearly unifying the black 
market and official exchange rate. Later, during the 1980s there was a 
progressive liberalization of the trading system. The results were im- 
pressive: nontraditional export growth was rapid, and provided the basis 
for overall growth of the economy in the 1980s. In their paper, Cel2sun 
and Rodrik discuss at some length the contribution  of the Turkish policy 
changes versus other special factors (e.g., the Iran-Iraq war) in promot- 
ing the export boom. 
As already noted, the Latin American regimes have all been char- 
acterized by  a considerable degree of import protection  and general 
anti-export bias.  In many  cases, the exchange rate was  allowed  to 
become severely overvalued in real terms (with a considerable black 
market premium on foreign exchange), with the exchange rate moved 
only in the midst of an extreme balance of payments crisis. As with 
the budget, the exchange rate policy appears to reflect political con- 
ditions in Latin America as much as  technical mistakes. The chronically 
overvalued exchange rate favors urban workers and the protected man- 
ufacturing sector at the expense of the agricultural sector, which has 
been politically weak in most countries since the Great Depression. 
There are some additional lessons regarding the trade regime that 
are raised by the country studies. Contrary to a common view, outward 
orientation in the NBER sample of countries is not at all the same thing 
as a free-market trade policy (see Sachs 1987 for a further elaboration 
of this distinction in the experience of the East Asian economies). The 
outward-oriented countries in the study, South Korea, Indonesia (to 
some degree), and Turkey in the 1980s, all had successful export growth 
with continued import restrictions and heavy government involvement 
in managing trade. The key instruments in stimulating exports was not 
import liberalization,  but  rather (1) a realistic and unified  exchange 
rate; (2) heavy investment in the exporting sectors, often spurred by 
government subsidies and direct credit allocations; and (3) an array of 
additional financial incentives for exporters. 
More generally, the South Korean case belies  the simple position 
often taken by the United States government and the IMF and World 
Bank, that “small”  government, as opposed to effective government, 
is the key to good economic performance. As the study by Collins and 
Park makes clear, the government of South Korea played a leading role 
in organizing economic development. The government was sufficiently 
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to finance domestic investment, and to pursue a long-term policy  of 
export-led growth. Also, given Korea’s relatively equal distribution of 
income (the result  in  large  part of extensive land reform in the late 
1940s and early 1950s), the government was able to devote its attention 
to matters of efficiency rather than redistribution. 
Another interesting  aspect of the experience of  South Korea and 
Turkey  is  the blurring  of  the distinction  over time between import- 
competing firms and exporting firms. It is notable that in both countries 
much of the export boom of the 1980s was based on investments during 
the 1970s in heavily protected industries, which became profitable for 
exports in the 1980s. Moreover, at the time that the investments were 
made, they were decried by economists as an inefficient allocation of 
investment spending, with  the incorrect argument (in hindsight) that 
such industries  could  not  be  expected to export in  the foreseeable 
future. As it turned out, productivity  improvements together with  a 
modest depreciation of the real exchange rate and an export-promoting 
regulatory environment were enough to make these sectors profitable 
for export in the 1980s. 
This finding is both good news and bad news for those who are hoping 
for a major export boom in the Latin American debtor countries. On 
the one hand, formerly protected industries can probably become ex- 
porting industries with  only moderate changes in  the real exchange 
rate. On the other hand, export promotion did not come out of thin air 
in  South Korea and Turkey, but rather out of heavy investment ex- 
penditure during the 1970s. Since the burden of debt servicing is now 
causing a major drain on investment spending in the heavily indebted 
countries, the base for future export promotion is jeopardized. The 
authors of the studies for Argentina,  Bolivia, Brazil, and Mexico all 
highlight  this dangerous situation  with  regard  to current investment 
spending. 
1.3  Adjustment to the Debt Crisis 
The NBER case studies examined  in  great detail  the process  of 
adjustment once a debt crisis begins. The patterns of adjustment in the 
eight countries under study certainly belie the easy optimism of the 
creditor community in the years after 1982. An external debt crisis sets 
in motion a process of economic deterioration that is extremely difficult 
to limit in the short term. Early optimistic forecasts of a rapid recovery 
in the debtor countries, such as by Cline (1984) or by Rimmer DeVries, 
relied on models that projected debtor country performance purely on 
the basis of external variables (e.g., world growth, interest rates, etc.). 
These studies entirely neglected the internal economic disarray in the 
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combined with a sharp fall in commodities prices and a sharp rise in 
world interest rates. 
The creditor community forecast a relatively smooth transition for 
economies that fell  into debt crisis.  Since the inflow  of  net  capital 
declined sharply after 1982, the debtor economies had to shift from a 
position of current account deficits (i.e., net foreign borrowing) to a 
position closer to current account balance. Initially, it was felt, this 
would be brought about through a reduction of imports; subsequently, 
exports would grow over time in line with the growth in the markets 
in the industrial economies. The debtor economies would shift smoothly 
to a trajectory of export-led growth. Along this path, exports would 
exceed imports to the extent necessary to finance interest servicing on 
the foreign debt. 
According to forecasting models such as Cline’s (1984), the success 
of this strategy depended centrally on the external variables facing the 
debtor country: industrial country growth, world  commodity prices, 
and world interest rates. Assuming an adequate trajectory for these 
variables  (3 percent OECD growth, gently rising commodities prices, 
and gently declining world real interest rates), the recovery would take 
care of itself. Economic growth and world interest rates turned out to 
be close to Cline’s estimates, though  the economic recovery in  the 
debtor nations did not materialize.  Part of the discrepancy in Cline’s 
forecast and the actual historical outcomes may have resulted from the 
decline in commodities prices after 1984, but a much larger part of the 
failure of Cline’s model resulted from his neglect of the internal eco- 
nomic effects of an external debt crisis. 
Remember that the debtor economies were hit by three simultaneous 
shocks: a cutoff in lending, a rise in world interest rates, and a fall in 
most commodities prices. The cutoff in new lending required that the 
current account balance move from deficit to near balance, and that 
the trade balance move from deficit to surplus (with the surplus required 
to finance the sharply higher interest  payments on the foreign debt). 
Cline stressed the required adjustment in trade flows, but not the equiv- 
alent required shifts in savings and investment. Since the net foreign 
capital inflows before  1982 were financing domestic investment in ex- 
cess of domestic savings, the cutoff in  lending required  a fall in  in- 
vestment relative to savings. As was shown in table 1.1, the common 
pattern was a sharp fall in the national investment rate after 1982. This 
fall in investment expenditure was bound to, have deleterious effects 
on future growth prospects. 
The cutoff in lending had particularly destabilizing effects since most 
of the foreign funds had been financing government deficits. All  of a 
sudden, governments had to start making significant net resource trans- 
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negative net resource transfers is shown in table 1.6, and is most dra- 
matic for Argentina, Bolivia, and Mexico. The shift for Brazil is delayed 
until  1985-86,  as is the case in Indonesia  and the Philippines. (Note 
that the shifts in net transfers would tend to be higher if  short-term 
debt were also included in the calculations.)  Governments were there- 
fore required to cut their non-interest  deficits sharply, or to shift the 
method of their finance. Most of the governments undertook harsh cuts 
in public sector investment, but dramatic as those cuts were, they were 
insufficient to eliminate the financing gap left over by the shift from 
net capital inflows to net capital outflows. 
Governments shifted to new forms of financing. Increased domestic 
bond  finance  tended to raise  real  interest rates  substantially,  while 
domestic money finance tended to raise inflation. Usually, governments 
struggled with  some combination  of lower public-sector  investment, 
higher internal real interest rates, and higher inflation. These adverse 
developments often undermined the fiscal situation even further. Higher 
inflation reduced the real  value of tax collections, while higher  real 
interest rates increased the burden of servicing the stock of internal 
public  debt. As recessions  developed  in the debtor countries, under 
the weight of higher real interest rates, reduced commodities prices, 
and  falling  public  spending,  the tax base fell  in  line  with  shrinking 
national income. 
By  1987, as a result of a pandemic fiscal crisis, very high inflation 
was deeply entrenched in the major debtor countries in Latin America. 
In  Argentina, Brazil,  Mexico, and Peru, inflation  was well  into the 
Table 1.6  Net Resource Transfers to the Public Sector (medium- and long- 
term debt, public and publicly guaranteed) 
Averages for period, percentage of  GNP: 
Country  1981-82  1983-84  1985-86 
Argentina  2.2  -  1.5  0.1 
Bolivia  0.0  -5.1  0.6 
Brazil  0.2  0.8  -2.2 
Mexico  1.8  -  3.5  -  0.8 
Indonesia  1.4  1.9  -  0.4 
Philippines  2.0  2.0  -  0.6 
South Korea  1.3  0.7  -  1.6 
Turkey  0.0  -  0.4  -  0.6 
Sources: Net resource transfers are defined  as net loans minus interest payments, on 
medium- and long-term debt on public and publicly guaranteed debt. Data are from the 
World  Bank, World Debt Tables, 1987-88,  and earlier for 1979-81.  GNP data are from 
the  IMF, Infernational Financial  Statistics  Yearbook, 1987. Note  that the  shift from 
positive to negative net transfers would tend to be even larger if  short-term debt were 
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triple-digit levels, as shown in  table  1.7. In Bolivia, a hyperinflation 
during 1984-85 was brought under control, in part through a suspension 
of interest servicing on the foreign bank debts of the Bolivian govern- 
ment. Even countries that had traditionally maintained very low infla- 
tion rates, such as Venezuela, were suffering with inflation many times 
the country’s norm. 
The adverse effects of the cutoff in lending were greatly exacerbated 
by the simultaneous deterioration in the terms of trade for most of the 
debtor countries. It cannot be claimed, as some have tried, that the 
commodity price decline was the major cause of the debt crisis, since 
some countries such as Bolivia and Mexico fell into crisis even though 
commodity prices  were strong by  historical  standards. Nonetheless, 
for almost all countries, prices for commodity exports fell in real terms 
after 1981, and thus exacerbated the capital market shocks. The decline 
in export prices lowered national income, and further squeezed gov- 
ernment revenues, since the revenue base in most of the debtor coun- 
tries was either directly or indirectly tied to commodity exports (directly 
through exports by  state enterprises, as in Bolivia and Mexico; indi- 
rectly through export taxes, as in Argentina). 
A  successful strategy of  debt  servicing  with  growth  requires the 
development of new exports. In general, however, major new export 
sectors require heavy investment. A devaluation can sometimes pro- 
duce a rapid  increase in  exports (as happened  in  South Korea and 
Turkey after 1980, and Brazil after 19831, but only if there is substantial 
excess capacity resulting from earlier investments (or if there is a sharp 
domestic recession, which may free up domestic capacity for export 




Country  1985  1986  1987b 
Argentina  385.4  81.9  175.0 
Bolivia  8,170.5  66.0  10.5‘ 
Brazil  228.0  58.4  366.0 
Ecuador  24.4  27.3  30.6 
Mexico  63.7  105.7  159.2 
Peru  158.3  62.9  114.5 
Venezuela  5.7  12.3  36.  I 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and  the Caribbean (ECLAC), “La 
evolucion economica en America Latina en 1987,”  January 1988 (Santiago, Chile). 
”Consumer Price Index, variations of December over December of previous year. 
hpreliminary. 
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if  the country produces tradables that are consumed domestically), 
Also, increasing the capacity of  export industries often requires both 
public and private investment. New export sectors generally require 
new  infrastructure in  transport, communications, and perhaps port 
facilities, that usually are in the domain of public investment. Unfor- 
tunately, public sector investment has been among the hardest hit areas 
of government expenditure in the crisis countries of Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Mexico, and the Philippines. 
1.3.1  Further Adverse Feedbacks in Adjusting to the Crisis 
Adjustment  to the external shocks has required  enormous relative 
price  changes within  the debtor economies, but  contrary to simple 
theory,  those relative  price changes have  often intensified  the crisis 
itself-at  least in the short term. The inevitable effect of the cutoff in 
foreign lending, higher  world interest rates, and adverse commodity 
price shocks, was a significant decline in domestic demand in the debtor 
economies, and therefore a sharp fall in the price of nontradable goods 
relative to tradable goods (i.e., a sharp  depreciation  of the real exchange 
rate, defined as the price of tradables relative to nontradables). This 
rapid shift against nontradables is, in principle, the motive force behind 
the desired shift in resources to tradables production. In practice, how- 
ever, the rapid collapse of nontradables production had several highly 
deleterious effects in the economies under study, that in fact may have 
impeded the longer term reallocation of resources. 
Most important, the collapse of nontradables prices led to financial 
distress for much of the nontradables sector. Not only did the profit- 
ability of nontradables production suffer when the real exchange rate 
depreciated, but nontradables firms that had  incurred dollar-denomi- 
nated debts found themselves unable to service their debts (the decline 
in  the relative  price of nontradables meant that nontradables output 
prices  failed  to keep pace  with the rising cost of foreign exchange, 
which has to be purchased  to service the debts). In many cases, the 
domestic commercial banks had borrowed internationally and then re- 
lent the borrowed funds in dollar-denominated  loans in the domestic 
capital markets to firms in the nontradables sector. When firms in the 
nontradables sector could not pay back their debts, much of the banking 
system was put in jeopardy in Argentina,  Bolivia, and Mexico. Note 
that firms  in  the  tradables sector were typically  better  prepared to 
service their dollar-denominated  debts, since tradables output prices 
moved in tandem with the price of foreign exchange. 
In turn, the collapse of  the banking system disrupted financial in- 
termediation  more generally. With banks at risk, domestic residents 
demanded a significant risk premium over  foreign interest rates in order 
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in Latin America were forced to take over many banks directly, or at 
least to take over the bad loans of much of the banking system. With 
many large conglomerates (known as grupos in  Latin America) in fi- 
nancial  distress, even the export-sector parts of  the conglomerates 
were unable  to attract new  credits. (See Galbis  1987 for a further 
discussion  of  the role of the grupos in  the Latin American financial 
system.) 
Note that the central government faced the same problems  as an 
overindebted firm in the nontradables sector. Since the public-sector 
debts were heavily dollar-denominated, while much of the tax base was 
effectively linked to nontradables production, the shift in the terms of 
trade against nontradables tended to exacerbate the fiscal deficits. Put 
another way, the domestic currency value of the government’s external 
debt rose sharply relative to the domestic currency value of the gov- 
ernment’s tax revenues. Thus, in Brazil, for example, what looked like 
a moderate fiscal burden of foreign debt suddenly became enormous 
after the real exchange rate depreciations during 1980-82. 
Once a government’s fiscal  situation  has seriously deteriorated, a 
fiscal crisis can become self-fulfilling, as argued recently by Guillermo 
Calvo (1987). The fear of high future inflation, for example, can raise 
nominal interest rates, and thereby raise the interest costs for the gov- 
ernment. Higher interest costs in turn widen the fiscal deficit and make 
inevitable the high future inflation. This kind of adverse feedback has 
apparently contributed to the sustained high interest rates in many of 
the debtor countries in recent years. 
Despite the centrality  of the public-sector  budget in the origin and 
development of the crisis, there are profound difficulties in measuring 
and forecasting the fiscal position. Even the IMF auditing of the fiscal 
accounts, as recorded in the IMF’s  Government Finance Statistics, are 
inadequate to the task. 
There are several kinds of measurement problems, many with eco- 
nomic significance.  First, actions with fiscal consequences (e.g., ac- 
tions that increase the public debt or the money supply) are made not 
only  by  the central government, but  also by  regional  governments, 
parastatal enterprises, development banks, and the central bank. Often, 
the finance minister has little ability to measure, much less control, the 
consolidated  public sector accounts. In most of the countries under 
study, the various governmental entities outside of central government 
can gain  direct access to the  central  bank,  or can get  government 
guarantees for foreign borrowing, without the authorization of the fi- 
nance minister. 
Another problem is that private-sector obligations often quickly be- 
come public-sector obligations when a financial crisis hits, a point that 
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and foreign creditors often insist as well that the central government 
make good on the private-sector debts. The government takeover of 
the debt can be partially disguised (or at least hard to measure) if the 
takeover comes in the form of  special exchange rates for debt repay- 
ments, subsidized  credits, or other off-budget means of  bailing  out 
private debtors. 
The net result of  this fiscal complexity is that many countries are 
forced to rely heavily on inflationary finance even when the measured 
central government budget seems close to balance. Cardoso and Fish- 
low discuss, for example, the data problems in  Brazil, where several 
years of  triple-digit inflation were accompanied  by  measured deficits 
near zero. The small measured deficits led some to conclude that the 
inflation was purely an “inertial” phenomenon. This view was tested 
in  the ill-fated Cruzado Plan, which attempted to use a wage-price- 
exchange rate freeze to break  the inertia. After  the collapse of  the 
Cruzado Plan, most observers now concede that large fiscal deficits 
are the driving force of the high Brazilian inflation. 
1.4  Renegotiating the Foreign Debt 
The historical record, and the country experience, speak strongly on 
another point. To get out of a debt crisis, countries have almost always 
required a sustained period of time in which the debt-servicing burden 
is sharply reduced or eliminated. This financial “time out” has come 
about through a combination of a negotiated reduction of payments (as 
in  the case of  Indonesia during  1966-71),  a  substantial increase in 
official lending (as in the case of Turkey during 1979-81), or a unilateral 
suspension of debt-servicing payments (as in the case of Bolivian com- 
mercial bank debt, 1986-87).  In recent years, most countries have not 
been  able to achieve a  significant “time  out”  through  conventional 
negotiations. The Turkish bailout in  1979-81,  for example, is a key 
exception that proves the rule. The generous official lending to Turkey 
during 1979-8 1 came mainly because of Turkey’s geopolitical signifi- 
cance as a NATO  ally on Iran’s border, rather than  as the result  of 
conventional debtor country negotiations. 
The NBER  historical  studies also make  clear that  debt relief has 
played an important role in the resolution of earlier crises. Relief has 
come in  many forms (e.g., debt repurchases  at a discount and con- 
versions of  debt into new debts with a lower  servicing burden) that 
might prove to be relevant in the present circumstances. The studies 
by  Lindert and Morton, and Eichengreen, both demonstrate that pre- 
vious debt crises have usually ended in some forgiveness. A compro- 
mise is typically reached in  which the debtors service some, but not 
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not the exception. In the past, the compromise was typically reached 
as the result .of bilateral  negotiations between debtors and creditors. 
Lindert and Morton suggest that the involvement in the 1980s of third 
parties (mainly the creditor governments and the international financial 
institutions) has hindered the effective (though often messy) process 
for arriving at a solution to excessive debt. 
The creditor view  that debt relief  would  be  harmful  even for the 
recipient debtor countries, because these countries would  be  closed 
out of capital markets for many years in the future, is not supported 
by the historical experience. Both Lindert and Morton, and Eichen- 
green, find that countries that have achieved  partial  debt relief  have 
not lost access to the markets to any greater extent than countries that 
continue to pay  their  debts. In  the  aftermath of  global  debt crises, 
neither “good” debtors nor “bad” debtors have been able to borrow. 
To quote Lindert and Morton, 
Defaulting debtors were not consistently punished. Only a few cases 
of countries trying to default in visible isolation led to direct sanctions 
and discriminatory denial of future credit. Most of  the defaults oc- 
curred in the worldwide crises of the 1930s-and  possible the 1980s- 
when uncooperative debtors suffered no more than cooperative ones. 
Eichengreen similarly concludes that, “If there were costs of default, 
they did not take the form of differential  credit-market access in  the 
first postwar decade.” 
History offers  many clear examples why.  Argentina,  for example, 
was the only country in South America to service the federal debt in 
the 1930s, under terms laid down by onerous treaties with Great Britain. 
The nationalist backlash against foreign influence helped to sweep Pe- 
ron into power. Peron’s populist policies more than undid any beneficial 
reputational  effects that Argentina might have garnered from its debt 
repayments in the 1930s. 
1.4.1  Debt Management during 1982-87 
The management of the crisis since 1982 has so far differed from the 
historical experience, at least in  the sense that negotiated debt relief 
has  so far played  little  role  in  the resolution  of  the  crisis.  Indeed, 
because of creditor government fears over the possibility  of an inter- 
national banking crisis, the whole thrust of creditor government policies 
since the crisis began has been to avoid debt relief, by pressuring the 
debtor countries to  remain  current on  their interest  servicing.  (See 
Sachs 1986 for an elaboration of this interpretation of creditor govern- 
ment policies.) 
The standard form of debt management was set in the aftermath of 
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and almost immediate actions in support of Mexico from the official 
financial community, under the leadership of the United States. Within 
days of  Mexico’s announcement that it would  be unable to meet its 
debt-servicing obligations, the U.S. government arranged for several 
forms of emergency official finance.  On the other hand, the United 
States pressed hard on Mexico to maintain interest servicing to the 
commercial banks. In November 1982 an agreement was reached be- 
tween Mexico and the IMF. 
One novelty of the Mexican agreement was to link the IMF financing 
with new “concerted” lending from Mexico’s bank creditors. The IMF 
declared that it would put new money into Mexico only if  the existing 
bank creditors also increased their loan exposure. The requisite agree- 
ment with the commercial banks (involving a loan of $5 billion, which 
covered a portion of Mexico’s interest costs in  1983) took effect  in 
early 1983. Additionally, the Mexican debt was rescheduled. Crucially, 
while  the rescheduling  called for a postponement of  repayments of 
principal, the rescheduling also provided for the continued and timely 
payments of all  interest due. In  fact, the spread over LIBOR (The 
London interbank offer rate for dollar deposits) on Mexican debt was 
increased in the agreement, so that in present-value terms, there was 
no sacrifice by the banks in the debt-rescheduling process. 
The Mexican agreement was quickly improvised, but it nevertheless 
became the norm for the dozens of reschedulings that followed. Like 
the Mexican program, virtually all of  the debt restructurings have had 
the following characteristics: 
1. The IMF has made high-conditionality loans to the debtor gov- 
ernment, but  such loans have been  made contingent on a res- 
cheduling agreement between the country and  the commercial 
bank creditors. 
2. The  commercial  banks  have  rescheduled  existing  claims,  by 
stretching out interest payments, but without reducing the con- 
tractual present value of repayments. 
3. The debtor countries have agreed to maintain timely servicing of 
interest payments on all commercial bank loans. 
4. The banks have made their reschedulings contingent on an IMF 
agreement being in place. 
5. The official creditors have rescheduled  their claims in the Paris 
Club setting, and have also made such reschedulings contingent 
on an IMF agreement. 
In the original conception of the debt management strategy, the con- 
certed lending was to play  a key role in guaranteeing  that countries 
receive an adequate amount of international financing in order to sta- 
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dropped off sharply. Moreover, as shown in table 1.8, only the largest 
debtors, with the greatest bargaining power vis-a-vis the commercial 
banks, have been able to obtain concerted loans with any regularity. 
In the table, Sachs and Huizinga (1987) measure the size of concerted 
loans in a given year as a proportion of disbursed debt at the end of 
the preceeding year. On average, this ratio is far higher for the large 
debtors (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico) than for the rest of the 
countries. Indeed, the fifteen  smallest  debtors in  the table had  3.4 
percent of the debt at the end of  1983, but received only 0.3 percent 
of the concerted loans during 1984-86. 
We  should stress as well that the whole notion of “new”  money in 
the concerted-lending  agreements is misleading, in the sense that most 
“new money” packages after 1982 have involved considerably less in 
new loans than was due to the same creditors in interest payments. 
Thus, even when Mexico or Argentina gets a new concerted loan, the 
check is  still  written  by the country to the creditors, since the new 
loan only covers a fraction of the interest that is due to the creditors. 
The fact of negative net resource transfers points up one of the fallacies 
in a popular argument as to why debtor countries should not default. 
It is sometimes  said that if  a country defaults, it will  not be able to 
attract new bank money. This is obviously not a major concern to a 
debtor country if the reduction in interest payments achieved by default 
systematically exceeds the amounts of new money that the country is 
able to borrow by not defaulting. 
1.4.2  The Default Decision 
It remains to ask why the debtor countries have by and large con- 
tinued to service their debts fully in the  1980s, despite the fact that 
this  has resulted  in  large net  resource transfers to the creditors, at 
considerable  economic cost to the debtor countries. In part, the answer 
may be simply one of time. In the first years of the crisis, most countries 
accepted the creditors’ arguments that the crisis could be quickly re- 
solved. As that has not come to pass, more and more countries are 
taking unilateral actions with respect to debt servicing. By the end of 
1987, several Latin American countries had unilaterally suspended at 
least part of the interest servicing of the debt, including Bolivia, Brazil, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Pan- 
ama, and Peru. 
Another aspect of the debt servicing policies  involves the balance 
of power between debtors and creditors. Debtor governments fear the 
retaliation of the commercial banks, especially in the form of a cutoff 
in trade credits. In fact, many of the countries that have suspended 
interest payments in  recent years (e.g., Brazil,  Ecuador, and Peru), 
have been able to maintain their trade credit lines, though often at the 
cost of a sharply higher risk premium on the short-term borrowing. 27  Introduction 
Table 1.8  Medium-Term Concerted Lending as a Percentage of Debt 
Outstanding and Disbursed from Financial Marketss 
Average 
1983  1984  1985  1986  1983- I986 
Argentinah  12  18  0  0  8 
Bolivia  0  0  0  0  0 
Brazil  11  14  0  0  6 
Chile  35  16  9  0  15 
Colombia  0  0  29  0  7 
Congo  0  0  0  9  2 
Costa Rica  0  0  0  0  0 
Dominican Rep.  0  0  0  0  0 
Ecuador  20  0  0  0  5 
Gabon  0  0  0  0  0 
Guatemala  0  0  0  0  0 
Honduras  0  0  0  0  0 
Ivory Coast  0  0  4  0  I 
Jamaica  0  0  0  0  0 
Liberia  0  0  0  0  0 
Madagascar  0  0  0  0  0 
Malawi  0  0  0  0  0 
Mexico  11  6  0  8  4 
Morocco  0  0  0  0  0 
Nicaragua  0  0  0  0  0 
Nigeria  0  0  0  4  1 
Panama  0  0  3  0  1 
Peru  16  0  0  0  4 
Philippines  0  18  0  0  5 
Senegal  0  0  0  0  0 
Sudan  0  0  0  0  0 
Togo  0  0  0  0  0 
Uruguay  18  0  0  0  5 
Venezuela  0  0  0  0  0 
Yugoslavia  41  0  0  0  10 
Zaire  0  0  0  0  0 
Zambia  0  0  0  0  0 
Sources: World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1986-87;  IMF, International Cnpital Markets, 
1986. Taken from Sachs and Huizinga (1987). 
"For each year f, we calculate the ratio of the concerted loan CL,, to the disbursed debt 
in year t - 1, D, - 1. 
1987 Argentina received a concerted loan amounting to 6 percent of  its  1986 out- 
standing loans. 
Another kind of retaliation that is feared is a reaction by the creditor 
governments (especially the United States), either within the financial 
sphere or more generally in other areas of foreign relations. Countries 
fear that  if  they  suspend interest servicing, they may  lose access to 
support from the IMF, the World Bank, the Paris Club (for a resched- 
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export credit agencies.  Moreover,  debtor governments fear that the 
leading creditor governments might  withdraw other forms of foreign 
policy support (e.g., involving trade policy, security assistance, etc.), 
and might even back political opponents of the regime. 
The United States government has repeatedly warned would-be re- 
calcitrant  debtors that nonpayments of  interest on the foreign debt 
constitutes a major breach of international  financial relations,  and a 
major breach of normal relations with the United States. Countries that 
choose default with their bank creditors are forced into the position of 
simultaneously  choosing a hostile action vis-&-vis the United  States 
government. Most finance ministers, and their presidents, do not have 
the stomach for such a confrontation, which takes steady nerves and 
a considerable capacity to explain the crisis to the domestic populace. 
A final, and often overlooked reason that countries do not default 
involves the domestic political economy of the debtor country. In the 
case of a unilateral  suspension  of debt payments, some sectors and 
classes of the economy will tend to gain and others will tend to lose. 
Gainers from tough bargaining  will  usually  include the nontradables 
sectors, urban workers, and landless peasants producing for the do- 
mestic market. Losers will include the tradables sectors (both because 
of repercussions on the exchange rate, and because of possible retal- 
iation), and the domestic financial community,  which has a stake in 
harmonious financial relations with the foreign banks. Left-wing gov- 
ernments, such as Alan Garcia’s in Peru, are therefore more likely to 
please their working class constituency by taking a hard  line on the 
debt than are governments oriented to exporters and the banking com- 
munity.  Most developing country governments, however, have  suffi- 
ciently close ties with leading bankers (domestic and foreign) and leading 
exporters, that they are unwilling to run the risk of an overt interna- 
tional confrontation. 
1.5  New Approaches to Managing the Debt Crisis 
The unsatisfactory  economic performance of  most  of  the  debtor 
countries in the past  five years has led to continued suggestions for 
new approaches to international debt management. The NBER studies 
by Fischer, Krugman, and Sachs consider several alternatives that have 
been widely discussed, as well as some new proposals. Edwards and 
Sachs discuss the appropriate role of the international institutions, and 
the appropriate kinds of policy reforms, for overcoming the crisis. 
All of the authors stress that a workable solution to the debt crisis 
will differ across countries. Some countries, such as Bolivia, Sudan, 
or  Zaire, clearly can service only a small fraction of their debt on market 
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1982-84,  the result was a hyperinflation (the links between debt serv- 
icing and hyperinflation are explained by  Morales and Sachs). Other 
countries can service some, but perhaps not all of their debts at normal 
market terms. Thus, a real case-by-case approach would recognize the 
need for substantial debt relief for some of  the poorest and weakest 
economies, and perhaps some lesser degree of relief for the other debtor 
countries. 
1.5.1 
Krugman and Sachs both illustrate the efficiency case for debt relief 
(See also Sachs 1988 for a further analysis). A heavy debt burden acts 
like a high marginal tax rate on economic adjustment. If the economy 
successfully imposes austerity, much of the benefit accrues to the for- 
eign creditors. Partial  debt relief can therefore be  Pareto improving 
(i.e., to the benefit of  both creditors and debtors), by  improving the 
incentives for the debtor country to take needed adjustment actions. 
In political terms, partial debt relief can strengthen the hand of mod- 
erates, who would pay some but not all of  the debt, against the hand 
of extremists, who would like to service little or none of the debt. 
Debt relief is extremely difficult to negotiate, for several reasons. 
First, because each debtor country has many types of  creditors, and 
the various creditors have the incentive to let the others grant the debt 
relief while they individually try to hold on to the full value of  their 
claims. Second, the linkage between debt relief and improved economic 
policies is not sufficiently tight to make debt relief an obvious propo- 
sition for the creditors, a point  stressed by  Sachs. Even if  creditors 
understand that the existing overhang of  debt acts as a major disin- 
centive to policy reform in the debtor countries, they might be skeptical 
that debt relief alone would be sufficient to lead to policy reforms. The 
creditors tend to view debt relief as throwing away money, i.e., giving 
up the potential of getting fully repaid, with little tangible benefit. As 
Sachs points out, the strongest case for debt relief can be made if  the 
relief can be explicitly conditioned on particular policy reforms in the 
debtor countries. 
Fischer offers an analysis of a broad range of proposals for modifying 
the current management  of  the crisis, dividing his  analysis between 
those alternatives that would merely restructure the debt, and those 
that would effectively cancel part of  the debt. In the first group, he 
considers debt-equity swaps, and echoes the conclusions of Krugman 
that debt-equity swaps are unlikely to be a major vehicle for resolving 
the crisis. Indeed Krugman shows how such swaps can very easily be 
detrimental to the debtor country. 
Among proposals that would offer partial forgiveness to the debtor 
countries (Le., an explicit write-down of  part of  the present value of 
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the debt), Fischer focuses heavily on the idea of creating an Interna- 
tional Debt Discount Corporation (IDDC). The IDDC would buy de- 
veloping country debt from the banks in exchange for claims on the 
institution, and in  turn collect from the debtor countries. The basic 
idea is that the IDDC would buy the debt at a discount, and then cancel 
some of the debt due from the debtor country. Calculations in Sachs 
and Huizinga (1987) show that the IDDC, far from hurting the com- 
mercial  banks, could  actually  raise  their  market value, because the 
bank stock prices have already been deeply discounted in view of their 
LDC debt exposure. 
Fischer stresses, however, that the most likely scenario is that partial 
relief will result from bilateral negotiations between creditors and debt- 
ors (as in the historical examples described by  Eichengreen, and by 
Lindert and Morton) rather than through a single international  relief 
operation. 
Krugman analyzes in  detail one purported remedy to the  current 
crisis:  the use of  so-called  debt-equity swaps. Upon close analysis, 
these transactions are much less attractive to the debtor country than 
they first appeared when the debt-equity schemes were introduced. In 
a typical  debt-equity swap, a foreign  direct investor purchases, at a 
discount, some sovereign debt in the secondary debt market (e.g., it 
pays a commercial bank $50 for $100 in face value claims on the gov- 
ernment of Mexico). It then returns the debt to the central bank of the 
debtor country, in  return for local currency that must be used for a 
direct investment in the country. The price that the central bank pays 
for the debt will generally lie between the second market price, ex- 
pressed in local currency, and the full face value of the claims. To the 
extent that the central bank pays more (in the local currency equivalent) 
for the debt than the secondary market price, the government is ef- 
fectively offering a subsidy to the firm making the foreign investment 
that is equal to the spread between the secondary market price and the 
repurchase price. 
In essence, then, the debt-equity swap amounts to a cash repurchase 
of debt by the government combined with a fiscal subsidy for foreign 
investment in the country. The main problems with debt-equity schemes 
are (1) that either piece of this transaction (the debt repurchase or the 
investment subsidy)  might be disadvantageous  from the country’s  point 
of view and (2) the debt-equity schemes link these two pieces, often 
in a confusing and arbitrary way, even though the country might be 
better off to pursue just one aspect of the policy (e.g., to repurchase 
its debt, but without a link to foreign direct investment). 
A cash repurchase of debt may or may not make sense. On the one 
side, it may  well  be highly  inflationary,  since a large cash outlay  is 
made to repurchase debt that would otherwise have been rescheduled 
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dertaking such a repurchase depends on the price of the repurchase. 
If the debt can be repurchased at a deep discount, it might make sense 
for a government to repurchase its debt. 
In typical debt-equity programs, however, the price paid by the cen- 
tral bank for the debt has been close to the face value of the bonds, 
so that the foreign direct investor rather than the debtor government 
gets the spread between the secondary market price of debt and the 
face value.  In effect, the discount on the bonds is used as a subsidy 
for direct investment. This is almost always a subsidy that the debtor 
country can ill  afford, since almost  by definition, the government is 
strapped for cash, and is very ill-placed to be offering a large subsidy 
to foreign firms for direct investment. Like most subsidy schemes, this 
kind of arrangement is likely to give most of the subsidy to firms that 
would have invested in any case, so that the incremental investment 
that is generated by the subsidy is likely to be very small. 
From the country’s point of view, therefore, it may make sense to 
engage in repurchases of debt, but it is less likely to make sense to link 
such repurchases to foreign investment in the country. However, as 
Krugman points out, there may  be contractual barriers to a govern- 
ment’s repurchase of its own debt, in which case a debt-equity scheme 
may be a way to overcome such contractual barriers. In such cases, 
however,  it still makes sense to design the scheme to emphasize the 
debt repurchase (by having the central bank repurchase the debt at the 
secondary market price), and  to play  down the investment subsidy 
component. 
1  S.2  Breaking the Cycle of Failed Reforms 
We  have stressed that policy “mistakes”  in the debtor countries are 
often not mistakes (in the sense that the government misunderstands 
the implications of  its  actions). Rather they are often  symptoms of 
deeper political  or economic problems  in  the debtor countries. The 
diagnosis that a budget  deficit is too large,  and therefore should  be 
reduced, is  not  a  complete diagnosis.  In  the abstract, most finance 
ministers understand that excessive inflation, or excessive foreign bor- 
rowing, result from excessively large budget deficits. At the same time, 
they are often unable or unwilling to do much to reduce the deficits. 
In order to improve the design of stabilization programs, and to improve 
the effectiveness of conditionality, we must therefore give greater em- 
phasis to why the political process produces the excessive deficits. The 
papers by Haggard and Kaufman, Sachs, and Edwards, as well as the 
country monographs in the companion NBER volumes, all emphasize 
the political context in which various economic policies are pursued. 
The basic ideas in most stabilization programs supported by the IMF 
and World Bank are quite straightforward, and aim to reduce budget def- 
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to international trade. The sobering point is that programs of this sort 
have been adopted repeatedly, and have failed repeatedly, in the coun- 
tries under investigation during the past 30 years. A major goal must be 
to understand why such programs typically fail. 
Consider the cases of Mexico and Argentina, for example. As the 
Mexican case study by Buffie and Krause makes clear, the “standard” 
package has been attempted in  1971, 1977, and  1983. In the first two 
cases, at least, major parts of the package were abandoned early on. 
Similarly, in Argentina, the “orthodox”  package has been tried under 
Peron, in  1951; Ongania,  in  1967 (the so-called  Krieger-Vasena pro- 
gram); Viola, in  1977-81  (with Martinez de Hoz as finance minister); 
and to some extent, Alfonsin, since 1985. Again, the staying power of 
the orthodox program has been very weak in Argentina. (In late 1987 
this weakness was again underscored, by the electoral  losses  of  Al- 
fonsin’s Radical party, and the electoral resurgence of the Peronists.) 
We  have already noted  that part of the problem with program im- 
plementation  lies in the deep political and class cleavages that afflict 
most of the countries under study, combined with weak political in- 
stitutions and fragmented political parties that fail to keep pace with 
rapid increases in political and social mobilization. The result, as pointed 
out by Samuel Huntington  in an influential treatise, is that “cliques, 
blocs,  and  mass movements struggle  directly  with  each other, each 
with its own weapons. Violence is democratized, politics demoralized, 
society at odds with itself” (Huntington  1968, 262). This is certainly 
an apposite sketch of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, the Philippines, and 
Turkey  at various  times  in  recent history.  In the end, governments 
alternate rapidly  between  civilian and military  regimes,  and budgets 
are exploited for short-term political advantage rather than long-term 
economic strategy. 
Interestingly,  Huntington  suggested that political  stability in  mod- 
ernizing societies can best be achieved through an alliance of an urban 
ruling elite  with  the rural masses. Ideally,  according  to Huntington, 
that alliance is cemented through agrarian reform and the organization 
of party support in the countryside. Among the countries under study 
in the NBER project, Indonesia and South Korea most closely fit Hun- 
tington’s characterization, as the governments have  sought  stability 
through an important base of rural support. (In the case of Indonesia, 
however, Soeharto’s stress on his rural constituency was combined, 
early in  his rule, with violent  repression of his  rural opposition.) In 
none of the Latin American countries in the NBER study have gov- 
ernments recently looked to the rural sector as the principal locus of 
political support. An apparent exception to this rule in Latin America 
is Colombia (unfortunately not studied in the NBER project), which 
is also the only major South American economy to have avoided a debt 
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Haggard and Kaufman identify several other features of the political 
landscape which affect a government’s capacity to carry out necessary 
economic adjustments, including  the administrative capacity of  the 
governments, the pattern of trade union organization, and the suscep- 
tibility of the political institutions to electoral business cycles. 
Sachs stresses that the normal  problems  of carrying out a reform 
program are greatly exacerbated by the overhang of foreign debt. Not 
only is the economic adjustment process made more difficult, but the 
political difficulties of reform are deepened as well. To the extent that 
the reforms serve mainly to raise the amount of foreign debt servicing, 
and so act as a tax on the domestic economy, they will find little political 
support domestically. Indeed, the government will be heatedly attacked 
for caving in to the interests of the foreign creditors. Adding debt relief 
as a part of the package of reform and adjustment could greatly enhance 
the likelihood  that the economic program  will in fact be carried out 
and sustained. 
Sachs also explores whether changes in  the nature of IMF/World 
Bank conditionality  could  increase the chances of  compliance with 
programs  monitored  by these institutions.  He argues that the nature 
of negotiations between the IMF and the debtor countries seems almost 
programmed to undermine the political legitimacy of Fund programs, 
thereby reducing their chance of success. In recent years, IMF pro- 
grams have been unrealistically harsh, as they reflect the priorities of 
the private creditors rather than the realities of economic adjustment. 
Though the IMF has not yet acknowledged  the possibility,  there are 
times when debts to private-sector creditors cannot or will not be paid 
in full. Automatically  designing programs  based on the opposite as- 
sumption is bound to lead to frustration and failure. 
Moreover,  the style of negotiations  seems problematic.  Most IMF 
programs  are negotiated  between a technocratic team in  the debtor 
government and the IMF staff, under conditions of secrecy. The letter 
of  intent  with  the IMF is  generally  not  made public  by  the debtor 
government. The result is that the agreement with the Fund often has 
little internal  political  support, and calls for actions by  parts of the 
government (e.g., the legislative  branch) or the private sector (e.g., 
the union organizations) that were not parties to the agreement. Since 
the actions are typically things that the government must do “down 
the  road,”  the  programs  are  signed,  and  then  not  adequately 
implemented. 
With regard to the substantive design of adjustment programs, Ed- 
wards disputes the notion that dramatic liberalization is helpful in the 
context of a debt or stabilization crisis, suggesting that dramatic lib- 
eralization has little basis in either theory or history. Edwards argues 
that rapid trade liberalization is likely to generate adverse employment 
effects in the short term, as occurred in the liberalization programs in 34  Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Argentina,  Chile, and  Uruguay in the 1970s. Similarly, abrupt deval- 
uations are likely to result in output losses and unemployment in the 
short run. 
1  S.3  The Global Macroeconomic Setting 
Even with debt relief, political resolve in the debtor countries, and 
well-designed  economic reform programs, the chances for economic 
recovery in the debtor countries will depend on an adequate interna- 
tional economic environment. Dornbusch suggests that the probability 
of a “soft-landing”  as the United States reduces its external deficits is 
rather low. In Dornbusch’s view, a successful adjustment path for the 
U.S. will require a period of progressively tighter fiscal policy combined 
with expansionary monetary policy, with a strong likelihood of rising 
inflation  in  the U.S. as the dollar continues to weaken. Dornbusch 
suggests that “the monetary authorities would have to be sufficiently 
accommodating and impervious to inflation, and asset holders would 
have  to  be  patient,  sitting  out  the  dollar  depreciation  without  a 
stampede.”  He concludes that  “this  does  not  seem  to be a  high- 
probability scenario.” 
Dornbusch’s emphasis on interest rates and monetary policies sug- 
gests one point of optimism regarding the debt crisis in future years. 
The crisis broke out decisively in the early  1980s when interest rates 
shot up above export growth rates. There are some good reasons for 
believing that real interest rates may now be in a steady decline (be- 
cause of  declining  U.S. budget  deficits,  a fall  in  U.S. consumption 
spending, and the apparent room for continuing ease in U.S. monetary 
policy, as  of late 1987). If this turns out to be the case, the fall in interest 
rates could significantly meliorate the crisis, in the same way that the 
sustained rise in real interest rates at the beginning of the 1980s was a 
decisive international shock that helped usher in the crisis. 
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